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Abstract 
The Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH) proposes that physiological feedback to the brain 
influences cognitive appraisal and decision-making; however, the strength of evidence in 
support of the SMH is equivocal.  In this study we examined the validity of the SMH by 
measuring physiological arousal in a population of healthy individuals playing the Iowa 
Gambling Task (IGT); a computerised card game designed to assess real-life decision-
making.  We also aimed to clarify uncertainty regarding the influence of reinforcer type and 
impulsiveness to IGT performance and the SMH.  Skin conductance level (SCL) and heart 
rate reactivity were measured in forty-one participants performing the IGT using either 
facsimile or real money.  Participants were categorised as non-impaired or impaired on the 
basis of their IGT performance, and any differences in performance and physiological 
between groups were examined.  Heart rate data did not reveal any effects.  Robust 
differences in SCL reactivity during the task were not found between impaired and non-
impaired individuals; however, marginal SCL rises were observed when non-impaired 
individuals anticipated and received a reward from disadvantageous choices compared with 
advantageous ones.  This effect was found only when using facsimile money and did not 
occur in impaired individuals, suggesting some effect of reinforcer type on physiological 
activity and performance, and a difference in the physiology of impaired and non-impaired 
individuals.    No significant differences in impulsiveness were found between impaired and 
non-impaired individuals.  The findings suggest that autonomic activity is independent of 
long-term good or bad decision-making, and may reflect differences between decks in the 
magnitude of gain and loss.  It is concluded that further substantiating evidence is needed for 
the SMH to continue as an explanation for human decision-making. 
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Does autonomic arousal distinguish good and bad decision-making?  Healthy individuals’ 
skin conductance and heart rate reactivity during the Iowa Gambling Task 
 
Since its introduction less than 15 years ago, the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH) 
(Damasio, 1994; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994) has quickly become an 
influential account of human decision-making.  The central proposal of the SMH is that 
physiological states of the body (somatic state) act to guide decisions.  When a decision must 
be made, factual information regarding the possible response options and their likely 
outcomes is recalled; associated with each response option outcome is a somatic state, which 
represents the physiological response of the body to the given situation.  When considering 
which response option to pursue, somatic states mark the ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ of each 
outcome based on the consequences of previous encounters with the same or similar 
situations.  These somatic markers thereby assist decision-making by rapidly rejecting bad 
choices and endorsing good ones, making the accompanying logic-based, cost-benefit 
analysis more manageable.  This process often operates outside of conscious awareness, as 
somatic markers can act both overtly and covertly.  Fortunately, indicators of autonomic 
nervous system activity, i.e. skin conductance level (SCL) and heart rate, may be used to 
signal somatic marker activity. Accordingly, the SMH predicts changes in SCL and heart rate 
when possible response options are being considered and somatic markers are acting to guide 
this process, i.e. in the period when a decision is being anticipated. 
The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) (Bechara et al., 1994) was created by Bechara and 
colleagues to provide an experimental measure of human decision-making and the SMH.  The 
task was designed to mimic real life decision-making in the way reward, punishment and 
uncertainty are represented.  Playing the task involves selecting sequential cards from four 
decks (A, B, C and D) in order to win money.  The decks differ in the magnitude and 
frequency of money lost and won.  Decks A and B are considered bad and indicative of 
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disadvantageous decision-making in that frequently selecting from these decks leads to long-
term losses.  Conversely, decks C and D are considered good or representative of 
advantageous decision-making as frequently selecting from these decks leads to long-term 
gains.  Normal performance on the task is characterised by selecting more cards from the 
good decks than the bad ones.  Bechara et al. (2001) reported that healthy individuals playing 
the task develop a preference for the good decks (C and D), and generate anticipatory skin 
conductance response (SCR) prior to a selection from a bad deck (A or B).  Carter and 
Pasqualini (2004) support the role of anticipatory somatic activity in guiding decisions in 
healthy individuals, reporting a positive correlation between anticipatory autonomic response 
and successful performance on the gambling task.  Crone, Somsen, Van Beek, and Van Der 
Molen (2004) also found changes in SCL and heart rate activity preceded the risky choices of 
healthy individuals showing good, but not poor, performance. 
Does Physiological Reactivity Guide Decisions? 
Although the SMH emphasises the role of anticipatory somatic markers as chief in 
guiding future decisions, the development of anticipatory somatic markers is contingent on 
appraisal (i.e. outcome) physiology.  Individuals acquire somatic markers via prior experience 
using feedback from appraisal physiology.  Accordingly, individuals who show poor or absent 
appraisal physiology should be unable to develop anticipatory somatic markers to guide future 
decisions, and thus exhibit impaired decision-making.  Consistent with this, Suzuki, Hirota, 
Takasawa and Shigemase (2003) found, in a population of 40 healthy individuals, that low 
appraisal SCRs in response to early trials were related to persistence in selecting risky choices 
on later trials.  However, despite the existence of greater magnitude anticipatory SCRs in 
response to risky choices, the expected relationship between anticipatory SCRs and 
performance was not supported, nor was there evidence of anticipatory SCR development 
over time.  These findings appear contrary to the assumption that decision-making 
performance depends on the development of anticipatory SCRs, and suggests that appraisal 
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physiology underlie individual differences in decision-making.  Conversely, Crone et al. 
(2004) found autonomic activity during appraisal to be independent from performance 
strategy, while heart rate slowing and SCL were greater preceding selections from bad but not 
good decks. 
Tomb, Hauser, Deldin and Caramazza  (2002) further challenge the notion that 
somatic states act to mark the long-term consequences of decisions.  They propose that high 
magnitude physiological responses are elicited when healthy participants anticipate bad 
decks, because bad decks yield rewards and punishments of high magnitude compared to 
good decks.  As such, the larger anticipatory SCRs observed for bad decks represents the 
magnitude of wins and losses rather than long-term outcomes.  Tomb et al. (2002) provide 
support for this idea using a modified version of the gambling task, in which good decks were 
associated with a higher magnitude of reward and punishment than bad decks.  They 
concluded that card selections are driven by long-term consequences, whereas anticipatory 
SCRs reflect the immediate choices at hand. 
Further criticisms of the SMH are presented by Maia and McClelland (2004) who 
conclude that there is no reason to think that somatic markers, as indexed by SCRs, play a 
causal role in guiding decision-making.  They base their conclusion on findings that healthy 
participants demonstrate sufficient conscious knowledge regarding the gambling task to 
behave advantageously. 
Real versus Facsimile Money 
The IGT has been subject to several variations in administration, one example of 
which is alteration in the type of reinforcer used to perform the task (e.g. real versus 
facsimile).  Research indicates good reason to believe that provision of a financial incentive 
influences performance on decision-making tasks (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001).  With this in 
mind, it is non-trivial that the original gambling task involves players using facsimile or play 
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money, whereas other researchers have altered this to using real money (e.g. Schmitt, 
Brinkley, & Newman, 1999; Bowman & Turnbull, 2003; Suzuki et al. 2003).   
Bowman and Turnbull (2003) compared the effect of using real versus facsimile 
money during the gambling task.  No significant differences were found as a consequence of 
money type; however, a non-significant variation between the two healthy groups’ 
performance indicated steep avoidance of bad decks following substantial losses in the real 
money condition.  Bowman and Turnbull (2003) suggest that this (non-significant) difference 
may indicate somatic markers of enhanced magnitude when using real money; however, their 
study did not incorporate physiological evidence to substantiate this claim.  A subsequent 
study by Carter and Pasqualini (2004) explored Bowman and Turnbull’s (2003) suggestion in 
a group of 30 healthy women, finding anticipatory SCR was related to amount of money won 
or lost, and indicating that stronger autonomic responses accompany better performance.  
However, contrary to Bowman and Turnbull’s (2003) prediction, there was no difference in 
aSCR magnitude of real versus facsimile money conditions. 
Financial incentive is suggested as the primary explanation for any effect of real 
versus facsimile money, and accordingly studies comparing these reinforcer types have 
allowed participants to keep all or a proportion of the final winnings (Schmitt et al., 1999; 
Bowman & Turnbull, 2003; Carter & Pasqualini, 2004; Fernie & Tunney, 2006).  However, 
the mechanism by which money exerts an effect may not be straightforward.  For example, 
providing a financial incentive may undermine intrinsic motivation, which can paradoxically 
lead to poorer performance (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001).  It is also possible that real money 
influences performance regardless of financial incentive.  This idea is consistent with recent 
research into the psychological consequences of money, which demonstrates that the very 
thought of money can lead to striking changes in behaviour (Burgoyne & Lea, 2006; Vohs, 
Mead, & Goode, 2006). 
Impulsiveness and Decision-making 
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The SMH is further complicated by reports from Bechara and colleagues (Bechara, 
Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999; Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000; Bechara et al., 2001; 
Bechara & Damasio, 2002), of healthy participants (20-37%) whose performance on the 
gambling task is equally impaired to that of patients with damage to the ventromedial region 
of the prefrontal cortex (VMpfc), despite exhibiting anticipatory SCRs for bad decks.  This 
finding appears contrary to the assumption that gambling task performance depends on the 
activity of somatic markers.   Bechara and colleagues (Bechara et al., 2000; Bechara, Dolan, 
& Hindes, 2002) explain that this pattern of performance may be the result of such individuals 
being high risk takers, who choose to override the activity of somatic markers by conscious 
deliberation.  It may similarly be speculated that impaired performance in healthy individuals 
is a consequence of cognitive impulsiveness, which manifests behaviourally as high risk-
taking. 
The Present Study 
The overall strength of evidence supporting the SMH is equivocal.  Whereas Damasio 
(1994) claims somatic markers are crucial in guiding decisions, other researchers (e.g. 
Schmitt et al. 1999; North & O'Carroll, 2001; Tomb et al. 2002; O'Carroll & Papps, 2003; 
Suzuki et al. 2003; Maia & McClelland, 2004) have failed to support the SMH’s assumptions.  
This study aimed to clarify previously inconsistent findings.  The study concentrated on the 
following questions: (i) does autonomic activity distinguish normal and impaired performance 
on the IGT in healthy individuals, (ii) does the use of real and facsimile money affect IGT 
performance and autonomic when there is no financial incentive, and (iii) does impulsiveness 
affect healthy individuals’ IGT performance and autonomic activity? 
To address the first question, we tested the following two predictions: (i) normal (non-
impaired) performers of the IGT have greater anticipatory skin conductance rise and heart 
rate slowing preceding disadvantageous decisions than impaired performers, and (ii) normal 
(non-impaired) performers of the IGT have greater appraisal skin conductance rise and heart 
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rate slowing preceding disadvantageous decisions than impaired performers.  To address the 
second question, we tested the following three predictions: (iii) participants’ performance on 
the IGT differs when using real money and facsimile money, (iv) anticipatory skin 
conductance rise and heart rate slowing will differ for real and facsimile money, and (v) 
appraisal skin conductance rise and heart rate slowing will differ for real and facsimile 
money.  In light of conflicting literature, we made no apriori prediction regarding the 
direction of expected effects.  To address the third question, we tested the following 
prediction: (vi) impaired performers of the IGT have greater levels of impulsiveness than non-
impaired individuals.  We also explored the role of impulsiveness on physiological indicators. 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-one healthy individuals participated in the study, ranging in age from 18 to 28 
(M = 20.5, SD = 2.8; 11 male, 30 female).  All participants were right-handed with no 
reported history of neurological or psychiatric illness, or learning disability.  English was their 
first language and all had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  Participants received course 
credit or were paid for their participation.  The study was approved by the School of 
Psychology Research Ethics Committee and informed consent was obtained from all 
participants. 
Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 1994) 
The task used was a computerised version of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT).  The 
task was presented using a laptop computer with a 14-in monitor, and a 4-key response box.  
Participants sat approximately 60 cm from the monitor.  They were presented with four decks 
of cards on the computer screen and the response box with buttons labelled (left to right) A, 
B, C and D.  At the top of the screen was a green bar, the size of which changed to reflect a 
proportionate change in the amount of money won or lost by the participant.  Immediately 
below the green bar was a red bar, which did not change during the task and represented the 
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amount of money loaned to the participant at the beginning of the task. Using the response 
box the participant selected one card at a time from any of the decks.  The computer (1) 
controlled the sequence of rewards and punishments from a pre-set schedule (Bechara et al., 
1994) that did not differ across participants, (2) tracked the sequence of card selections from 
the various decks, and (3) recorded physiological activity during the task.  Following a card 
selection the face of the card (coloured entirely black or red) appeared on top of the deck and 
a message was displayed indicating how much had been won or lost.  A win / reward was 
accompanied by a smiley face, increase in size of the green bar and short sound similar to a 
casino slot machine followed by a man saying “you’ve been practicing”.  A loss / punishment 
was accompanied by a sad face, decrease in size of the green bar and another short sound 
followed by a man saying “you lose!”  The participant was free to ponder which deck to 
choose next once money had been added / subtracted and the face had disappeared.  This 
period was indicated by a 5-second countdown displayed in the centre of the screen.  A 
selection could only be made after the countdown had ended. 
Performing the task involved using one of two reinforcer types: facsimile money (FM) 
or real money (RM).  In the FM version, money was represented only as a number on the 
computer screen.  In the RM version, real money (pounds sterling) belonging to the researcher 
was dealt out and taken away to reflect wins and losses on the computer screen.  Participants 
were not allowed to keep any money.   
The magnitude of all wins and losses were reduced by a factor of 100 compared to the 
original IGT, due to the use of real money.  Every time a card was selected from decks A or B 
the participant won £1, and every time a card was selected from decks C or D they won £0.50.  
Punishment in decks A and B was such that a total loss of £12.50 was encountered in every 
10 cards (net loss £2.50).  Punishment in decks C and D resulted in a total loss of £2.50 in 
every 10 cards (net gain £2.50).  The decks also differ in that decks A and C contained five 
small punishments per 10 card selections (i.e. punishment on 50% of selections).  Decks B 
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and D contained one large punishment per 10 card selections (punishment on 10% of 
selections). 
The total number of trials was set at 100 card selections.  The trial sequence started 
with the presentation of the stimulus display (as described above) and 5-second countdown.  
The end of the countdown indicated that participants should respond.  Responses were made 
using the dominant hand.  Following the response, a 2-second outcome display (smiley / sad 
face and win / lose message) replaced the stimulus display.  Reponses were made 
approximately 500-1000ms following the countdown end, resulting in an intertrial interval of 
approximately 8 seconds.  These timings were similar to studies by Bechara et al. (1996), 
Bechara and Damasio (2002), and Crone et al. (2004). 
Impulsivity Measures. 
Go/NoGo test (Zimmermann & Fimm, 1995).  The Go/NoGo is designed to assess the 
ability of participants to suppress undesired motor responses and was used as a measure of 
motor impulse control.  This computerised test presents participants with five visual stimuli 
(boxes filled with different patterns), two of which are targets.  Stimuli appear in random 
order, one at a time in the centre of the computer monitor.  Participants are required to 
respond, by depressing a response button as quickly as possible, whenever either of the two 
target items appear, and must suppress making unwanted responses to the three distractor 
stimuli.  The outcome measure used in the present study was median reaction time. 
Stroop test (Trenerry, Crosson, DeBoe, & Leber, 1989). The Stroop Colour-Word 
Interference Task is a widely used behavioural assessment of response inhibition.  In this test 
participants are presented with 112 words of colour names printed in ink of a conflicting 
colour (e.g. the word RED printed in blue ink), and are asked to state the colour of the ink in 
which the word is printed.  The task requires participants to suppress a habitual response (i.e. 
read the word) in favour of an unusual one (i.e. state the ink colour).  The outcome measure 
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used was total number of words for which ink colour is correctly stated (i.e. colour-word 
score). 
Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS, version 11; Barratt & Patton, 1983).  The BIS-11 is a 
4-point Likert scale containing 30 items, covering three domains: Attentional Impulsiveness 
(AI), Motor Impulsiveness (MI) and Non-planning impulsiveness (NP).  AI evaluates actions 
precipitated by lack of attention; MI evaluates hyperactivity due to need of movement; and 
NP evaluates attitudes and conclusions precipitated by lack of reflection.  Responses describe 
the frequency with which a given item is characteristic of the individual’s behaviour / 
thinking, on a scale ranging from ‘rarely’ to ‘always’.  The combined score of AI, MI and NP 
(i.e. BIS-11 total score; maximum possible score = 120) was used as the outcome measure in 
the present study. 
Physiology Recording and Reduction 
An IBM-compatible computer controlled the timing and presentation of all stimulus 
materials and recorded all performance data.  SCL was recorded continuously during the task 
as per the procedure of Crone et al. (2004).  SCL was measured in microsiemens (µS) using 
silver/silver chloride electrodes filled with 0.05M of electrode gel and attached to the distal 
phalanx of the index and ring finger of the non-dominant hand.  The electrode sites were 
cleansed with an isopropyl alcohol swab beforehand.  Blood pulse volume (BPV) was 
measured using a photoplethysmography sensor attached to the distal phalanx of the middle 
finder of the non-dominant hand.  Because of the influence of hand or arm movements on the 
photoplethysmograph recording, participants were instructed to keep their non-dominant hand 
still during the task.  SCL and BPV were fed into a Thought Technology ProComp+ real-time 
physiological monitoring unit.  Peak pulse amplitudes served to trigger a cardiotachograph, 
which recorded the interval between successive pulse volume peaks (in ms).  Peak-peak 
intervals were converted to HR (in bpm).  SCL, BPV and cardiotachograph output were 
graphically displayed and recorded on an IBM-compatible laptop PC.  The graphical display 
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enabled visual detection of artefacts arising from spurious peak amplitude identifications or 
no detection of peak amplitudes that were very small.  Any artefacts were removed and a 
mean of the HR and SCL values immediately preceding and following the artefact inserted. 
Baseline Physiology.  Baseline measures were taken from continuous recording of 
SCL and HR data from the last 50 seconds of a 5 minute pre-experimental relaxation period.  
The average SCL and HR during this period was calculated.  50 seconds were selected owing 
to software limitations, which meant that the maximum period of data recording visible at any 
one time was 50 seconds. 
Anticipatory Physiology.  Anticipation responses were measured during the 5 s 
countdown prior to each card selection.  Raw SCL and HR were averaged over these 5 
seconds.  In order to minimise any pre-existing individual differences in physiology, change 
scores were calculated by subtracting values derived from the last 50 s of the pre-
experimental baseline from the raw score (Myrtrek & Foerster, 1986).  Mean SCL change in 
the 5 s time window preceding a card selection was considered an event-related response 
elicited by the anticipated decision. 
Appraisal Physiology.  Two types of appraisal were assessed: (1) Punishment - after 
turning a card for which there was a reward immediately followed by a penalty, and (2)  
Reward - after turning a card for which there was a reward not followed by a penalty.  Raw 
reward / punishment SCL and HR were calculated by averaging the 2-seconds immediately 
after each card selection.  Change scores for these periods were calculated as above.  Mean 
reward / punishment SCL change in the 2 s time window following a card selection was 
considered an event-related response elicited by the outcome stimulus. 
The duration of our anticipation and appraisal time windows were selected to reflect 
those of existing research (Bechara et al.. 1996; Bechara and Damasio, 2002; Crone et al., 
2004) and permit comparison with these studies.  Additionally, Dawson, Schell and Filion 
(2000) state that an electrodermal response beginning 1-4 seconds following stimulus onset is 
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considered to be elicited by that stimulus; they further recommend a time windows of 1-4 s or 
shorter to avoid stimulus related activity being contaminated with non-specific changes in 
autonomic arousal.  Our timings considered the ability to capture stimulus elicited changes in 
physiology, while maintaining a reasonable length of time for participants to complete the 
task. 
Procedure 
On arrival at the laboratory (light, temperature, and sound controlled) participants 
were given an overview of the experimental procedure.  They were then attached to the 
physiological apparatus and asked to relax for 5 minutes, during which time baseline 
measures of SCL and HR were taken.  Participants then completed the three impulsivity 
measures and gambling task in random order.  For the gambling task participants were 
randomly allocated to one of two reinforcer types prior to commencement of the task: (a) 
facsimile money (FM) or, (b) real money (RM).  All participants received a standard set of 
verbal instructions identical to those of Bechara et al. (1999), apart from an additional 
statement to participants in the RM condition that RM would be dealt out and taken away 
during the task, but that this money could not be kept at the end of the experiment.  Following 
receipt of instructions, participants performed a practice trial, consisting of 5 card selections, 
to ensure they fully understood the nature of the task and knew how to respond.  Once the 
practice was complete participants were given the opportunity to ask questions and, where 
necessary, clarification was offered by paraphrasing the instructions. The experimental task 
then began, with participants instructed to continue playing until the computer stopped.  
Following 100 card selections the experiment ended and the total money the participant 
possessed was displayed on the screen. Participants were then unwired, thanked and 
debriefed.  
Data Analyses 
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IGT performance data was available for 41 participants (FM = 20, RM = 21).  
Complete physiological data was available for 39 participants.  Physiological data was 
incomplete for a further two participants due to (1) equipment malfunction resulting in no 
SCL data being recorded (1 participant), and (2) a failure of the equipment to detect a BVP 
signal (1 participant).  Where available, physiological data from these two participants was 
used in analyses, otherwise missing data values were entered. 
Performance.   Behavioural performance on the task was analysed following the 
method of Bechara et al., (1994).  The 100 card selections were subdivided into five blocks of 
20 cards each and a net score was derived for each block by summing the number of 
selections from decks C and D (good) and subtracting the number of selections from decks A 
and B (bad) (i.e. net score for block = (C+D) – (A+B)).  Net scores below zero indicate bad or 
disadvantageous selecting, whereas net scores above zero indicate good or advantageous 
selecting.  Furthermore, we followed the convention set by Bechara (Bechara et al., 2001; 
Bechara & Damasio, 2002) to subdivide participants into impaired and non-impaired 
performance on the basis of their maximum net score; whereby a maximum net score of <10 
represents impaired performance.  A final behavioural measure derived from the task was the 
total amount of money lost or gained.   
Analysis of performance comprised 2 (reinforcer type: FM, RM) by 2 (performance 
group: impaired, non-impaired) ANOVAs calculated for total net score and final money 
amount separately.  Group differences in measures of impulsiveness were examined using 
Mann-Whitney U tests, with performance group (impaired, non-impaired) as the independent 
variable and BIS-11 total score, Stroop Colour-Word score, and Go/NoGo median reaction 
time as dependent variables.  Non-parametric tests were used for the latter analysis as 
impulsiveness data were not normally distributed. 
Physiological activity.  Analysis of physiological activity pooled data from bad decks 
(A+B) and good decks (C+D), as is typical in previous studies (e.g. Bechara et al., 1996).  
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Physiological activity during anticipation and appraisal (reward and punishment) periods were 
analysed separately, as were SCL and HR activity.  To check for pre-existing differences 
between reinforcer and performance groups, SCL and HR during the pre-experimental 
baseline were submitted to separate 2 (reinforcer type: FM, RM) by 2 (performance group: 
impaired, non-impaired) ANOVAs.  Subsequent 2 (deck type: bad, good) by 2 (reinforcer 
type) by 2 (performance group) mixed ANOVAs were calculated for SCL and HR activity 
during anticipation and appraisal periods, with repeated measured on the first factor.  We also 
explored the relationship between measures of impulsiveness and physiological activity by 
calculating 2-tailed correlations between these two variables. 
Results 
Performance 
 Table 1 summarises the total net score and final amount of money won or lost 
according to reinforcer type and performance group. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Total amount of money won or lost on the task did not differ significantly between 
FM and RM conditions, F(1,37) = 1.70, p = .20; however, total net scores were marginally 
greater using FM than RM, F(1,37) = 3.58, p = .066.  Using the criteria applied by Bechara 
and colleagues (Bechara et al., 1999; Bechara et al., 2000; Bechara et al., 2001; Bechara & 
Damasio, 2002) 25 out of 41 (61%) participants were impaired in their performance on the 
gambling task.  As expected, impaired individuals showed significantly poorer performance 
than non-impaired individuals, in terms of both final money, F(1, 37) = 13.60, p = .001, and 
total net score, F(1,37) = 43.06, p < .001.  There was no interaction of performance group 
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with reinforcer type, as measured by final money or total net score (both ps > .10), indicating 
that marginal differences in performance when using different reinforcer types were not 
influenced by whether overall performance was impaired or non-impaired.  Finally, 
examination of impulsiveness measures revealed no significant differences between impaired 
and non-impaired individuals (all ps > .10). 
Physiological Reactivity 
All analyses were conducted for measures of both SCL and HR; however, no 
significant main effects or interactions were identified using the HR data.  For brevity, the HR 
results are not reported.  Means and standard deviations of SCL activity during the task are 
summarised in table 2.  There were no pre-existing differences in the baseline SCL of 
individuals in the FM and RM group, or impaired and non-impaired group. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
 
SCL in anticipation of choices.  A main effect of deck type was borderline significant, 
F(1,36) = 4.08, p = .051, indicating that anticipatory SCL rise was greater preceding 
selections from bad decks compared to good ones.  However, SCL did not differentiate 
impaired and non-impaired performance on the task, F(1,36) = .10, p = .751.  Contrary to 
prediction, greater anticipatory SCL rise did not precede disadvantageous choices in non-
impaired individuals; this was qualified by the absence of a deck type by performance group 
interaction, F(1,36) = .43, p = .516, which indicated that skin conductance activity preceding 
disadvantageous and advantageous choices did not differ as a function of overall impaired or 
non-impaired performance on the task. 
  Autonomic arousal during good and bad decisions      17 
 
There was no main effect of reinforcer type, F(1,36) = .11, p = .744; however, a 
marginally significant deck type by reinforcer type interaction, F(1,36) = 3.84, p = .058, 
showed larger SCL rises preceding selections from disadvantageous decks than advantageous 
decks when using FM, F(1,18) = 10.92, p = .004, but no differential anticipatory SCL when 
using RM, F(1,18) = .001, p = .97. 
SCL following choices resulting in a reward.  A main effect of deck type, F(1,36) = 
8.34, p = .006, indicated SCL activity following a reward was greater for disadvantageous 
decks than advantageous decks.  No main effect of reinforcer type, F(1,36) = .14, p = .710, 
but a deck type by reinforcer type interaction, F(1,36) = 8.92, p = .005, indicated that SCL 
following a reward differed as a function of reinforcer type.  Larger SCL rise followed 
rewards from bad decks than good decks when using facsimile money F(1,18) = 23.79, p 
<.001, but no difference in SCL occurred when using real money, F(1,18) = .003, p = .95.  
Furthermore, a marginally significant three-way interaction between deck type, reinforcer 
type and performance group, F(1,36) = 3.64, p = .065, suggested that the deck type by 
reinforcer type interaction differed for impaired and non-impaired individuals.  Examining 
impaired performers in isolation revealed no main effect of deck type, F(1, 22) = 1.76, p = 
.198, nor a deck type by reinforcer type interaction, F(1,22) = .70, p = .411.  This indicated 
that the main effect of deck type and deck type by reinforcer type were solely the result of the 
reward SCL in non-impaired individuals.  Unlike individuals whose performance on the task 
was not impaired, impaired individuals’ reward SCL activity did not differentiate good and 
bad choices when using FM. 
SCL following choices resulting in a punishment.  Analysis of SCL for punishment 
failed to reveal any main effects or interactions (all ps > .10) 
Relationship between impulsiveness and physiology.  BIS-11 total score correlated 
marginally with SCL following a choice resulting in a punishment (rs = .30, p = .06).  All 
other correlations were non-significant (see table 3). 








This study concentrated on three questions: (i) does autonomic activity distinguish 
normal and impaired performance on the IGT in healthy individuals, (ii) does the use of real 
and facsimile money affect IGT performance and autonomic activity when there is no 
financial incentive, and (iii) does impulsiveness affect healthy individuals’ IGT performance 
and autonomic activity?   
Does autonomic activity distinguish normal and impaired performance on the IGT in healthy 
individuals? 
We made two predictions regarding the effect of autonomic activity on IGT 
performance in healthy individuals: (i) normal (non-impaired) performers of the IGT have 
greater anticipatory skin conductance rise and heart rate slowing preceding disadvantageous 
decisions compared with impaired performers, and (ii) non-impaired performers of the IGT 
have greater appraisal skin conductance rise and heart rate slowing following disadvantageous 
decisions compared with impaired performers.  First, the distinction between impaired and 
non-impaired performance was validated by a significant difference between the two groups’ 
performance, in terms of overall net scores and final money.  Furthermore, differences in 
anticipatory and reward SCL were detected between disadvantageous and advantageous 
decks, indicating that autonomic activity is sensitive to differences between the two deck 
types.  Consistent with the work of others, greater SCL rise preceded selecting from 
disadvantageous decks (e.g. Bechara et al., 1999; Bechara & Damasio, 2002; Bechara et al., 
2002; Crone et al., 2004) and following  rewards (Suzuki et al., 2003), but not punishments.  
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However, we found no evidence to support our first prediction: that anticipatory SCL and 
heart rate discriminated impaired and non-impaired performance groups, and little evidence to 
support our second prediction: that appraisal SCL differs in impaired and non-impaired 
individuals. An exception was a marginally significant three-way interaction, which suggested 
that non-impaired individuals experience greater SCL rise following a reward from a 
disadvantageous deck (when using facsimile money), whereas impaired individuals show no 
differentiation in SCL.  This finding lends support for the suggestion of Suzuki et al. (2003), 
that appraisal physiology relates to risky choices and poor performance.  We found a trend to 
suggest that changes in SCL following a reward from a risky choice are absent in individuals 
whose performance is impaired.  However, this finding should be interpreted cautiously, as 
the interaction was only marginally significant. 
On the whole, the predictions arising from the SMH were not well supported, 
suggesting that good and bad performance may be independent of physiological reactivity.  
This is consistent with Maia and McClelland (2004), who conclude there is no evidence to 
suggest that decision-making on the IGT depends on differences in somatic state.  Likewise, 
Tomb et al. (2002) believe that performance (i.e. card selection) on the IGT is guided by long-
term consequences, but that higher anticipatory skin conductance reactivity to bad decks 
simply reflects the higher magnitude of potential reward or punishment with which they are 
associated.  Our finding of higher SCL rise when anticipating and being rewarded from 
disadvantageous decks (high magnitude) compared with advantageous decks (low magnitude) 
is consistent with Tomb et al’s (2002) explanation. 
Does the use of real and facsimile money affect IGT performance and autonomic activity 
when there is no financial incentive? 
To address the second question, we tested the following three predictions: (i) 
participants’ performance on the IGT differs when using real money and facsimile money, (ii) 
anticipatory skin conductance rise and heart rate slowing differ for real and facsimile money, 
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and (iii) appraisal skin conductance rise and heart rate slowing differ for real and facsimile 
money.  Regarding the first prediction, results of the present study indicated marginally 
greater net scores when the task was performed using facsimile money.   This suggests some 
difference in performance as a consequence of reinforcer type, although the marginal effect 
means this conclusion cannot be stated with a high degree of certainty.  Secondly, the use of 
real versus facsimile money was found to influence autonomic activity during the task, 
despite no difference in financial incentive of the two conditions.  Greater SCL rise occurred 
in anticipation of a selection from disadvantageous decks compared with advantageous decks 
when facsimile money was used.  This SCL rise did not occur when real money was used.  An 
identical pattern of SCL rise occurred following a reward from disadvantageous decks when 
using facsimile, but not real, money. 
The direction of effects found is somewhat surprising.  The behavioural data indicate 
better performance when using facsimile money and, consistent with this, physiological data 
indicated greater changes in SCL activity when using facsimile money only.  Paradoxically, 
Bowman and Turnbull (2003) did not find significant differences in overall performance on 
the IGT using real and facsimile reinforcers; however, they propose that using real money 
leads to a steeper learning curve and greater magnitude somatic markers.  Also contrary to 
findings of the present research, Carter and Pasqualini (2004) found participants in a real 
money condition won marginally greater money, but did not differ from a facsimile money 
condition on mean anticipatory SCR.   
It is not clear why our findings conflict with those of previous research.  One possible 
explanation pertains to the novel methodological aspect of the present research, whereby 
participants were not permitted to keep any money they won regardless of reinforcer type.  
This manipulation served to examine whether using real money would influence behaviour 
when there is no financial incentive.  Research into the psychological consequences of money 
suggests the very presence of money can lead to considerable changes in behaviour 
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(Burgoyne & Lea, 2006; Vohs et al., 2006).  It is possible that previous null findings of real 
versus facsimile money could be explained by an undermining of the intrinsic motivation of 
participants when a financial incentive is offered (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001).  We did not 
offer a financial incentive, thereby rendering facsimile and real money essentially analogous.  
Unfortunately, we are unable to provide a speculation as to why facsimile money leads to 
better performance and more pronounced changes in physiology than real money when 
financial incentive is eliminated. 
Does impulsiveness affect healthy individuals’ IGT performance and autonomic activity? 
To address the third question, we tested the prediction that impaired performers of the 
IGT have greater levels of impulsiveness than non-impaired performers.  We also explored 
the role of impulsiveness on physiological indicators. 
Bechara and Damasio (2002) claim that healthy individuals who perform as impaired 
on the gambling task are likely to be high-risk takers and thrill seekers in real life.  These risk-
seeking individuals over-ride the action of somatic markers by conscious deliberation, 
resulting in poor performance despite guiding somatic activity.  Crone et al. (2004) suggest 
that poor IGT performance may be a secondary consequence of the behavioural 
characteristics of impulsivity.  Using several measures of impulsiveness, we failed to find 
evidence of any differences in the impulsiveness of impaired and non-impaired individuals.  
These findings go some way to supporting Bechara and colleagues (Bechara et al., 2000; 
Bechara et al., 2002), in suggesting impaired gambling task performance is not related to 
motor impulsiveness / response inhibition as measured with a Go/NoGo task and Stroop test.   
We also attempted to investigate the relationship between risk-taking and impaired 
IGT performance, by assessing motor and attentional impulsiveness, and non-planning 
behaviour using the BIS-11.  We found self-reported impulsive behaviour and thinking were 
no greater in individuals with impaired performance than non-impaired individuals.  
However, a marginally significant, weak correlation was found between BIS-11 score and 
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punishment SCL for disadvantageous decks.  This finding should be interpreted cautiously as, 
although impulsiveness of the kinds measured by the BIS-11 has been related to risk-taking 
(Eysenck & Eysenck, 1977), no direct behavioural or self-report measure of risk-taking was 
taken. 
Conclusion 
The present study did not find a consistent pattern of findings to indicate that decision-
making in healthy individuals depends on physiological arousal.  In agreement with Maia and 
McClelland (2004), we believe additional evidence is required for the SMH to continue as a 
prominent explanation of human decision-making. 
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Table 1.   
Average net score and monetary outcome as a function of performance and reinforcer type. 
Outcome Performance type Reinforcer type M S.D. 
Net Score Overall Facsimile money 11.00 23.26 
  Real money -0.10 15.99 
 Impaired Facsimile money -3.64 15.56 
  Real money -8.71 11.94 
 Non-impaired Facsimile money 28.89 18.09 
  Real money 17.14 4.88 
Final money Overall Facsimile money 19.03 7.63 
  Real money 16.45 5.08 
 Impaired Facsimile money 14.95 6.29 
  Real money 15.07 4.73 
 Non-impaired Facsimile money 24.00 6.16 
  Real money 19.21 4.93 
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Table 2.   
Mean baseline SCL and change scores as a function of performance, reinforcer and deck 
type. 
 Impaired performance Non-impaired performance 








Baseline 4.05 (1.04) 3.81 (1.83) 4.19 (1.78) 3.68 (1.83) 
     
Anticipation     
Disadvantageous 3.04 (2.51) 2.94 (2.66) 2.37 (1.72) 3.20 (2.11) 
Advantageous 3.00 (2.58) 2.84 (2.71) 2.41 (1.68) 2.86 (2.20) 
     
Reward     
Disadvantageous 3.03 (2.50) 2.89 (2.58) 2.32 (1.78) 3.36 (2.13) 
Advantageous 2.99 (2.60) 2.74 (2.67) 2.36 (1.75) 2.87 (2.13) 
     
Punishment     
Disadvantageous 2.71 (2.41) 2.66 (2.54) 2.06 (1.74) 2.68 (2.09) 
Advantageous 2.59 (2.53) 2.51 (2.71) 2.13 (1.71) 2.48 (2.16) 
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Table 3.   







Anticipation    
 Disadvantageous .25 (.11) .01 (.96) -.12 (.47) 
 Advantageous .25 (.12) -.04 (.79) -.17 (.29) 
    
Reward    
 Disadvantageous .26 (.11) .03 (.86) -.17 (.30) 
 Advantageous .25 (.13) -.02 (.91) -.18 (.27) 
    
Punishment    
 Disadvantageous .30 (.06) .01 (.96) -.15 (.35) 
 Advantageous .26 (.10) -.03 (.85) -.21 (.21) 
 
